Faults and Improvements of an Enhanced Remote User Authentication Scheme
  Using Smart Cards by Kumar, Manoj
  1 
Faults and Improvements of an Enhanced Remote User 
Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards  
Manoj Kumar 

	
					
	
	
			

	
		 ! "	#$	%&''%% 	
E. Mail: yamu_balyan@yahoo.co.in 
  
Abstract — In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards to solve the problems 
of Lamport scheme. Later, Chan- Chang, Shen- Lin- Hwang 
and then Chang-Hwang pointed out some attacks on Hwang – 
Li’s scheme. In 2003, Shen, Lin and Hwang also proposed a 
modified scheme to remove these attacks. In the same year, 
Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan showed that modified scheme 
proposed by Shen-Lin-Hwang is still insecure. In 2004, 
Awasthi and Lal enhanced Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme to 
overcome its security pitfalls. This paper analyses that the 
user U/smart card does not provide complete information for 
the execution and proper running of the login phase of the 
Awasthi- Lal’s scheme. Furthermore, this paper also modifies 
the Awasthi- Lal’s scheme for the proper functioning 1.  
 Index Terms — Cryptography, Authentication, Smart 
cards, Password. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
o authenticate the legitimacy of the remote users over 
insure channel, a remote password authentication scheme 
is used. In such a scheme, the password often regarded as a 
secret shared between the authentication server (AS) and 
serves to authenticate the identity of the individual logging on 
to the server. Through the knowledge of the password, the 
remote user can use it to create a valid login message to the 
authentication server. AS checks the validity of the login 
message to provide the access right. Password authentication 
schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote 
user authentication environment. So far different types of 
password authentication schemes with smarts cards [1] – [3]-
[4] –[5] –[6] –[11] –[13] –[14] – [18] have been proposed. 
In 1981, Lamport [12] proposed a remote password 
authentication scheme using a password table to achieve user 
authentication. In 2000, Hwang and Li [13] pointed that 
Lamport’ s scheme suffered with the risk of a modified 
password table and the cost of protecting and maintaining the 
password table. Further, they also proposed a new remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards, which is based on the 
 
1
 Manoj Kumar is with the Department of Applied Sciences and 
Humanities, Sharda Group of Institutions (SGI), Jawahar Nagar, Khandri, 
Agra, India - 282004, (e-mail: yamu_balyan@yahoo.co.in 
Chayayamu@yahoo.co.in) 
 
most popular ElGamal’s Cryptosystem [15]. This scheme [13] 
does not maintain the password table to check the validity of 
the login request. Also, it can withstand message-replaying 
attack.  
In [7], Chan and Cheng pointed out an attack on the Hwang-
Li’s scheme. In 2003, Shen-Lin-Hwang [9] discussed a 
different attack on the Hwang-Li’s scheme and they also 
proposed a modified scheme to prevent the attacks on Hwang-
Li’s scheme.  In the same year, Chang and Hwang [3] 
explained the practical problems of the Chan – Cheng’s attack 
on the Hwang-Li’s scheme and Leung – Cheng - Fong and 
Chen [10] pointed out that the Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme is 
still vulnerable to the attack proposed by Chan and Cheng. In 
2004, Awasthi - Lal [1] proposed an enhanced remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. 
A. Contributions 
This paper aims to show that Awasthi - Lal’s scheme 
required more information for the execution of the login phase. 
This paper also presents a modified remote user authentication 
scheme to remove the problems of Awasthi - Lal’s scheme. 
B. Organization 
Section II reviews the Hwang – Li’s scheme [13]. Section III 
describes the cryptanalysis of Hwang – Li’s scheme. Section 
IV reviews the Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme [9]. Section V 
reviews the Leung – Cheng - Fong and Chen [10] attack on 
Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme. Section VI reviews the Awasthi - 
Lal’s scheme [1]. Section VII yields an objection on the 
Awasthi - Lal’s scheme and pointed out the problem of the 
scheme. An improved variant of remote user authentication 
scheme is presented in section VIII. The security of the 
proposed scheme is discussed in section IX. Finally, comes to 
a conclusion in the section X. 
II. REVIEW OF THE HWANG-LI’S SCHEME 
There are three phases in the Hwang-Li’s scheme: the 
registration phase, login phase and the authentication phase. In 
the registration phase, the user U sends a request to the AS for 
the registration. The AS will issue a smart card and a password 
to every user legal through a secure channel. In the login 
Phase, when the user U wants to access the AS, she/he inserts 
her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the 
identity and the password to access services. In the 
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authentication phase, the AS checks the validity of the login 
request. 
A.  Registration Phase 
User U
 
submits her/his ID to the AS. AS computes the 
password PW
 
for the user U, as, 
PW
 
 = ID
 
xs
 mod p, 
where, xs is a secret key maintained by the AS and p is a 
large prime number. AS provides a password PW and a smart 
card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card 
contains the public parameters ( f, p), where f  is a one-way 
function. 
 
B.  Login Phase 
User U
 
attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader 
and keys ID
 
and PW. The smart card will perform the 
following operations:  
1. Generate a random number r. 
2. Compute  C1=  ID r  mod  p.  
3. Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PW ) mod p –1, where T  is the  
current date and time of the smart card reader. 
4. Compute  M = ID t  mod  p.  
5. Compute  C2= M (PW)r  mod  p.  
6. Sends a login request C = (ID, C1, C2, T) to the AS. 
B. C.  Authentication Phase 
Assume AS receives the message C at time Tc , where Tc is 
the current date and time at AS. Then the AS takes the 
following actions: 
1. Check the format of ID. If the identity format is not 
correct, then AS will rejects this login request. 
2. Check, whether Tc – T ≤ ∆ T, where ∆ T is the legal time 
interval due to transmission delay, if not, then rejects the 
login request C. 
3. Check, if C2 (C1xs)-1 
?
=  (ID) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS 
accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request 
will be rejected. 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE HWANG- LI SCHEME 
A. Chan and Cheng’s Attack 
According to Chan and Cheng [7], a legal user Alice can 
easily generate a valid pair of identity and password without 
the knowledge of secrete key  ‘xs’ of AS. Alice uses her valid 
pair (IDA, PWA) to generate another valid pair (IDB, PWB) as 
follows: 
Alice computes IDB = (IDA × IDA) mod p. Then, she can 
computes the corresponding password 
                    PWB = IDB
xs
 mod p 
                            = (IDA × IDA) xs mod p 
                            = (PWA × PWA) mod p 
As a result, Alice can generate a valid pair (IDB, PWB) 
without knowing the secret key xs.  
B.  Shen-Lin-Hwang ‘s Attack: Masquerading Attack 
According to Shen, Lin and Hwang [9] masquerading attack 
is possible on Hwang- Li’ s scheme. A user Bob can 
masquerade another user Alice to login a remote server and 
gain access right.  
Bob computes an identity IDB = IDA
k
 mod p, where k is a 
random number such that gcd (k , p) = 1.Then, he submits this 
identity IDB to AS for registration. AS provides a smart card 
and a password 
PWB = IDB
xs
 mod p. 
With the knowledge of PWB, Bob can compute  
PWA = IDA
xs
 mod p = PWB
– k
    mod p. 
As a result, Bob can masquerade as Alice to login a remote 
server and gain access privilege. 
C. Chang- Hwang’s Attack 
According to Chang and Hwang [2], there is a mistake in the 
Chan- Cheng’ s attack. It is not always possible that the square 
of a legal identity satisfies the specific identity format. Chang 
and Hwang generalized the Chan- Cheng’ s attack. They 
described two attacks.  
1) Attack- Ι 
Alice computes IDB = IDA
k
 mod p, where k is a random 
number. Then, he can computes the corresponding password 
                    PWB = PWA k mod p. 
As a result, a legal user Alice can impersonate other user 
Bob with a valid pair of (IDB, PWB) to login the AS. If IDA is a 
primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and their 
corresponding password can be generated easily. 
2) Attack- ΙΙ 
A group of eavesdroppers may cooperate to generate a valid 
pair of identity (IDG, PWG ), as follows: 
IDG =∏ IDAj mod p and PWG = ∏ PWAj mod p 
Chang and Hwang pointed out that in Hwang – Li’s scheme, 
it is still difficult to obtain the corresponding password for a 
known arbitrary valid identity, but once the valid identity is 
generated, its corresponding password will be obtained easily. 
IV. SHEN, LIN AND HWANG’S SCHEME 
Shen-Lin-Hwang [9] proposed a modified remote user 
authentication scheme to solve the security pitfall of the 
Hwang-Li’s scheme. Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme uses the 
concept of hiding the identity to prevent the masquerading 
attack. They modified the registration phase, now a shadow 
identity SID will be issued to the legal user. This modified in 
the registration phase is described below. 
A. Modified Registration Phase 
A user U
 
submits her/his identity string J
 
to the AS for the 
registration. The string J contains the name, address, unique 
number etc. This information in the string J is unique for every 
user. Then the AS computes a pair (SID, PW) for the user U 
after the identity J is identified. The pair  (SID, PW) is 
computed as follows: 
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SID = Red (J) and PW = (SID) xs mod p 
where, Red (.) is a shadow identity of device which is only 
maintained in the remote server and SID  is the shadow identity 
of the user U. Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart card 
and  (SID, PW) to the user U  in a secure way. The smart card 
contains the public parameters ( f, p). 
In this scheme, the message sent to the AS now contains 
(SID, C1, C2, T). Because Ji specially formatted, the evil user 
cannot compute new identity string Ji via SIDi. 
V. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE SHEN, LIN AND HWANG’S 
SCHEME 
A. Leung- Cheng-Fong –Chan’s  Attack 
According to Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan [10], Shen-Lin-
Hwang’s scheme [9] defends the attacks of registration for a 
new identity IDB via IDA for a legal user Alice. They also 
pointed out that the modified scheme is still vulnerable to the 
attack described by Chan and Cheng. They showed that the 
modified scheme is not secure against the attack that is similar 
to Chan - Cheng and Chang – Hwang’s attacks. If we replace 
IDA with SIDA, then the Chang and Hwang’s attack will work 
as follows. 
     Alice computes SIDB= (SIDA)k mod p, where k is a random 
number. Then, he can computes the corresponding password 
PWB = PWA k mod p. 
As a result, a legal user Alice can impersonate other user 
Bob with a valid pair of (SIDB, PWB) to login the AS. If SIDA 
is a primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and their 
corresponding password can be generated easily. Since, Chan 
– Cheng’ s attack is one case of this attack so it also works 
well. 
VI. REVIEW OF THE AWASTHI  - LAL ’S SCHEME 
Awasthi and Lal [1] suggested a new way to enhance the 
security of the Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme [9] against 
Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan’s attack [10]. This section 
provides a review of Awasthi and Lal’s scheme. 
A.  Initialization Phase 
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters 
p                   : a large prime number. 
f                    : a one-way function. 
xs               : a secret key of  the system, which is only 
possessed  with the AS. 
    Red (.)         : a function which is re-direct the identity of 
the user and only possessed with the AS. 
B.  Registration Phase 
 User U submits her/his identity ID to the AS. Then, AS 
computes the followings: 
SID = Red (ID) , and  PW =( SID) xs  mod p. 
The AS distributes the smart card and the pair (SID, PW) to 
the user U. The smart card contains the public parameters (f, 
p). 
C.  Login Phase 
To login at any time T, the user U attaches her/his smart 
card and keys her/his identity ID and password PW. The smart 
card does the following: 
1. Generate a random number r. 
2. Computes C1= (SID) r mod p.  
3. Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PW) mod p –1. 
4. Compute  m = (SID) t mod  p.  
5. Compute  C2= m (PW ) r mod  p.  
6. Sends a message LR = (ID, C1, C2, T) to the AS. 
D.  Authentication Phase 
Assume that the AS receives the login request LR at time TS. 
Then, AS does the following steps: 
1. Test the validity of the ID.  
2. Computes SID = Red (ID). 
3. Test the validity of the time delay between TS  and T. 
4. Check, if C2 = (C1xs)(SID) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS 
accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request 
will be rejected by AS. 
VII. OUR OBJECTION 
This section analyzes the login phase of Awasthi and Lal’s 
scheme.  Although Awasthi and Lal suggested a different way 
to enhance the security of Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme [9] 
against Leung-Cheng-Fong-Chan ‘s attack. But, when we 
observe the login phase of Awasthi and Lal’s scheme, it is 
found that the user U/smart card does not provide complete 
information for the execution and proper running of the login 
phase. 
In Awasthi and Lal’s scheme to login at any time T, the user 
U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and keys 
her/his identity ID and password PW. In the second steps, the 
smart card computes C1= (SID) r mod p, while the number SID 
neither stored in the smart card nor this number is supplied by 
the user U at the time of login.  
In the login phase, we observe that the information which 
are provided by the User U and through the smart for the login 
to AS are not sufficient for the functioning of the login phase. 
However, the scheme is not fit for the practically 
implementation.  
Consequently, the login phase of Awasthi and Lal’s scheme 
does not work properly due to the lack of information.  As a 
result, Awasthi and Lal’s scheme is not suitable for real 
grounds. 
VIII. AN IMPROVED SCHEME 
This section modifies Awasthi and Lal’s scheme to attain 
better and proper functioning. The proposed scheme is an 
improved variant of the original scheme: Hwang and Li’s 
scheme.  The modified scheme is described below. 
A .  Initialization Phase 
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters 
p                   : a large prime number. 
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f                    : a one-way function. 
xs               : a secret key of  the system, which is only 
possessed  with the AS. 
    Red (.)         : a function which is re-direct the identity of 
the user and only possessed with the AS. 
B.   Registration Phase 
Assume that this phase is executed over a secure channel.  
User U submits her/his identity ID to the AS. Then, AS 
computes the followings: 
SID = Red (ID) and PW =(SID) xs mod p. 
Here SID is the redirected identity corresponding to the 
registered identity ID. The AS distributes the smart card and  
(SIDID , PW) to the user U in a secure way (say physically). 
The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p). 
C.   Login Phase 
The user U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card 
reader at any time T
 
and keys her/his identity SIDID and 
password PW. The smart card conducts the following 
computations: 
1. Generate a random number r. 
2. Computes C1= (SID) r mod p.  
3. Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PW ) mod p –1. 
4. Compute  m = (SID) t mod  p.  
5. Compute  C2= m (PW ) r mod  p.  
6. Sends a message LR = (ID, C1, C2, T ) to the AS. 
D.  Authentication Phase 
Assume that the AS receives the login request LR at time Tc. 
Then, AS does the following computations to check the 
validity of the login request LR. 
7. Check the specific format of ID . If the format of the 
ID 
 
is incorrect, then AS rejects the login request LR.  
8. Check, whether Tc – T ≤ ∆T, where ∆T is the legal 
time interval due to transmission delay, if not, then 
AS rejects the login request LR. 
9. Computes SID = Red (ID). 
10. Check, if C2
?
=  (C1xs)(SID) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS 
accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request 
will be rejected by AS. 
IX.  SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME 
The above scheme is a modified form of the original 
scheme: Hwang-Li’s scheme. The security analysis has been 
already discussed and demonstrated in [13]. Therefore, this 
section will only discuss the enhanced security features of the 
proposed scheme.  
A.  Shen- Lin- Hwang’s attack 
The functionality of the redirected function Red (.) blocks 
the masquerade attack via registration phase: Shen- Lin- 
Hwang’s attack. The function Red (.) generates a valid number 
SID with the help of the identity ID, which is sent by the user U 
at the time of registration request. The eavesdropper cannot 
compute a valid SID for any fake identity IDF. 
 Thus, Bob cannot masquerades as Alice. For the reason, 
this scheme is secure against the masquerading attack. 
B. Chan- Cheng’s attack and Chang- Hwang’s Attack 
The functionality of the redirected function Red (.) also 
blocks the attacks via authentication phase: Chan- Cheng’s 
attack, Chang- Hwang’s Attack and all extended attacks. 
However, Alice computes S
BID  
= (S
AID
)k mod p, where k is a 
random number. Then, he can computes the corresponding 
password 
PWB = PWA k mod p. 
This result is still incomplete; for the success of these 
attacks, it is essential to obtain the corresponding IDB. In the 
proposed scheme, the redirected function Red (.) is a secret 
function and always in possession of AS only. As a result, a 
legal user Alice cannot compute a valid pair of redirected 
identity SID /identity ID and password to impersonate other 
user Bob to login the AS. Thus, Chang- Hwang’s Attack will 
not work. Since, Chan – Cheng and Leung – Cheng - Fong 
and Chen’ s attacks are the extended form of Chang- Hwang’s 
Attack, so these attacks also do not work on our scheme. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzed that in Awasthi and Lal’ s scheme, the 
user U/smart card does not provide complete information for 
the execution and proper running of the login phase. 
Furthermore, this paper also proposed a modified remote user 
authentication scheme, which is secure against Shen- Lin- 
Hwang’s attack Chan- Cheng’s attack and Chang- Hwang’s 
Attack and all extended attacks. 
REFERENCES 
[1] A. K. Awasthi and S. Lal, “An enhanced remote user authentication 
scheme using smarts cards”, IEEE Trans. Consumer Electronic, vol. 50, 
no. 2, pp. 583-586, May 2004. 
[2] C. C. Chang and K. F. Hwang, “Some forgery attack on a remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” Infomatics, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 
189 - 294, 2003. 
[3] C. C. Chang and S. J. Hwang, “Using smart cards to authenticate remote 
passwords,” Computers and Mathematics with applications, vol. 26, no. 
7, pp. 19-27, 1993. 
[4] C. C. Chang and T. C. Wu, “Remote password authentication with 
smart cards,” IEE Proceedings-E, vol. 138, no. 3, pp. 165-168, 1993. 
[5] C. C. Lee, L. H. Li and M. S. Hwang, “A remote user authentication 
scheme using hash functions,” ACM Operating Systems Review, vol. 
36, no. 4, pp. 23-29, 2002. 
[6] C. C. Lee, M. S. Hwang and W. P. Yang, “A flexible remote user   
authentication scheme using smart cards,” ACM Operating Systems 
Review, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 46-52, 2002. 
[7] C. K. Chan and L. M. Cheng, “Cryptanalysis of a remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE Trans. Consumer 
Electronic, vol. 46, pp. 992-993, 2000. 
[8] H. M. Sun, “An efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart 
cards,” IEEE Trans. Consumer Electronic, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 958-961, 
Nov 2000. 
[9] J. J. Shen, C. W. Lin and M. S. Hwang, “A modified remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards,” IEEE Trans. Consumer 
Electronic, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 414-416, May 2003. 
[10] K. C. Leung, L. M. Cheng, A. S. Fong and C. K. Chen, “Cryptanalysis 
of a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards”, IEEE Trans. 
Consumer Electronic, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 1243-1245, Nov 2003. 
  5 
[11] L. H. Li, I. C. Lin and M. S. Hwang, “A remote password authentication 
scheme for multi-server architecture using neural networks,” IEEE 
Trans. Neural Networks, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 1498-1504, 2001. 
[12] L. Lamport, “Password authentication with insecure communication,” 
communication of the ACM, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 770-772, 1981. 
[13] M. S. Hwang and L. H. Li, “A new remote user authentication scheme 
using smart cards,” IEEE Trans. Consumer Electronic, vol. 46, no. 1, 
pp. 28-30, Feb 2000. 
[14] T. C. Wu, “Remote login authentication scheme based on a geometric 
approach,” Computer Communication, vol. 18, no. 12, pp. 959 - 963, 
1995. 
[15] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based 
on discrete logarithms,” IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 31, 
No. 4, pp. 469-472, July 1985. 
[16] T. Hwang and W.C. Ku, “Reparable key distribution protocols for 
internet environments,” IEEE Trans. Commun. , vol. 43, No. 5, pp. 
1947-1950, May 1995. 
[17] W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen, “ Weaknesses and improvements of an 
efficient password based user authentication scheme using smart cards,” 
IEEE Trans. Consumer Electronic, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 204 –207, Feb 
2004. 
[18] Y. L. Tang, M. S. Hwang and C. C. Lee, “A simple remote user 
authentication scheme,” Mathematical and Computer Modeling, vol. 
36, pp. 103 - 107, 2002. 
                                                   
 
 Manoj Kumar received the B.Sc. degree in 
mathematics, in 1993; the M. Sc.  in Mathematics, 
in 1995; the M.Phil., in Cryptography, in 1997;  the 
Ph.D. in Cryptography, in 2003. He also taught 
applied Mathematics at DAV College, 
Muzaffarnagar, India from Sep, 1999 to March, 
2001; at S.D. College of Engineering & Technology, 
Muzaffarnagar, U.P., India from March, 2001 to 
Nov, 2001; at Hindustan College of Science & 
Technology, Farah, Mathura, continue from Nov, 2001. He also passed the 
National Eligibility Test (NET), conducted by Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR), New Delhi- India, in 2000. He is a member of 
Indian Mathematical Society, Indian Society of Mathematics and 
Mathematical Science, Ramanujan Mathematical society and Cryptography 
Research Society of India. His current research interests include 
Cryptography, Numerical analysis, Pure and Applied Mathematics.   
 
 
 
 
